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Summary findings
The impact of macroeconomic  crises  on parents'  Second, mean educational attainment was
investments in the human capital of their children is a  significantly  higher for children who were  exposed to the
widely contested issue.  Schady analyzes the effects of the  crisis than for those who were not.
profound macroeconomic  crisis in Peru  in 1988-92 on  Schady argues that these findings  may be related:
the schooling  and employment  decisions made  by urban  children who are not employed  have more time available
school-age children.  He arrives at two basic findings:  and may therefore put more effort into school.  He
* First, the crisis had no effect on the attendance rates  concludes with a discussion  of the implications of his
of school-age  children.  But the share of children who  findings for the design of appropriate social protection
were both  employed and in school fell significantly  policies.
during the crisis.
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Sudden economic downturns,  resulting from factors such as fiscal weakness, weak
financial  systems, changes  in prices of primary commodities,  and natural disasters are a reality in
many Less Developed  Countries (LDCs), and will continue to be a concern in the future.
Countries  in East Asia faced  a massive  economic contraction in 1998; Latin American countries
generally had low or negative  growth rates during the "lost decade" of the 1980s, and many
countries in the region,  including Argentina,  Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico,  and Peru faced  sharp,
precipitous drops in GDP; very steep economic downturns are also an unfortunate fact of life for
many African countries.
There has been a recent surge  in academic and policy interest in the effect of
macroeconomic  crises on household behavior.  Of particular concern are household investments
in human capital.  An oft-made argument is that households who are unable to smooth
consumption  perfectly may cut back the expenditures they make on the education, health, and
nutrition of their children during a crisis.  The World Bank's flagship publication,  World
Development Report 2000/01:  Attacking Povertv,  strikes a particularly dire note: "When a crisis
strikes and households  cannot borrow  or when adult unemployment is high or wages low,
children are pulled out of school and  sent to work.  The lost schooling leads to a lifelong  loss in
earning ability for these children.  Failures in the credit or labor markets thus transmit poverty
and vulnerability across generations"  (World Bank 2001, p.  146; see also Lustig 2000).
The theory of human capital suggests that macroeconomic  crises can affect the total
amount of schooling,  the timing of this schooling,  and the effort which is devoted to schoolwork.
In the standard neoclassical  model of human capital investment,  individuals acquire  schooling
until the (expected) marginal benefit to an additional  year of education equals the marginal cost
(Rosen 1977;  Willis  1986).
The marginal benefit is given by the increase  in the discounted expected stream of
eamings  resulting from one more year of schooling.  The marginal cost of an additional year of
schooling  is given by the foregone  income, and by direct private costs such as tuition and
transportation.  The marginal cost will be increasing in years of schooling (or age) if net forgone
earnings  or tuition increase with schooling.  Borrowing constraints  may be an additional cost of
attending school because they prevent consumption smoothing (Becker 1964; also Jacoby  1994
for an analysis of Peru).  Low-income households,  in particular,  are more likely to both be unable
to borrow and to lack "internal finance"  for education purposes.
What is the effect of an adverse macroeconomic  shock on the schooling decision?  In
general,  a crisis will depress current employment and wage prospects, and the opportunity cost of
3attending school represented will fall.  Holding everything else equal, this should lead to an
increase  in human capital investment.  But a macroeconomic  shock could also make borrowing
constraints more binding, and thus depress the total amount of schooling chosen.
When macroeconomic  shocks are persistent, they may also depress expected lifetime
earnings,  and have an effect on the marginal benefit from schooling.  If the lifetime earnings of
all individuals are reduced by the same percentage,  regardless of their schooling, then the
marginal benefit associated with an additional  year of schooling will be lower (by this same
percentage).  But crises need not have  such a uniformn across-the-board effect on expected
earnings.  For example,  if the expected  lifetime earnings for individuals with less education are
disproportionately affected by the crisis, the marginal benefit to schooling could rise.
Insofar as they change the marginal costs of schooling, macroeconomic  crises may also
affect the timing and intensity of schooling-in particular, the extent to which children combine
schooling with part-time employment.  Finally, the effect of a crisis on the wages and
employment prospects of adults in a household may also have an effect on the schooling and
employment decisions taken by children.
The basic point of this discussion  is that the effect of a macroeconomic crisis on
schooling is indeterminate  in theory.  Children (or their parents) may seek more or less total
schooling, they may anticipate or postpone further schooling,  and they may expend more or less
effort in school (for example, by combining school and work).  The total effect of a crisis on
schooling will depend on the relative magnitude of the changes  in the marginal costs and benefits
from education,  as well as on the cross-price elasticity of child employment and adult wages.
Not surprisingly,  the empirical evidence on the effect of systemic shocks to household
income on schooling outcomes  is mixed.  In the United States, Goldin (1999) finds a large
increase in secondary  school enrollment rates during the Great Depression, especially in those
states that were hardest hit by unemployment.  In the LDC setting, Neri and Thomas (2000)
suggest that enrollment decisions are unaffected by macroeconomic conditions  in Brazil, although
grade attainment appears to suffer during a crisis.  Cunningham and Maloney (2000) find that
girls (but not boys) are more likely to drop out of school during a crisis in Argentina, while both
boys and girls are less likely to drop out during crises in Mexico.2 Using cross-country
regressions, Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenstein (1998) report that macroeconomic shocks have
negative effects on enrollment,  and Behrman, Duryea, and Szekely (2000) suggest that the poor
macroeconomic  prospects of the 1980's in Latin America set back the rate of growth of schooling
attainment in the region.  In Indonesia, Beegle,  Frankenberg and Thomas (1999),  Cameron
4(2000), Filmer et. al. (2001) and Pradhan and  Sparrow (2000) all report some impact of the crisis
on enrollment, although the effects tend to be small.
This paper analyzes the effect of the prolonged economic crisis in Peru between  1988 and
1992 on school attendance, employment,  and the number of years of completed schooling.  The
Peruvian case is appealing from an analytical  point of view for a number of reasons.  First, the
crisis in Peru was particularly deep and prolonged:  National accounts data suggest that GDP per
capita fell by almost 30 percentage points between  1988 and 1992.  The depth and duration of the
crisis could severely stretch the ability of households to protect investments  in schooling.
Second, reliable household data are available for Peru.  Three Living Standards Measurement
Surveys (LSMS) cover the period before the crisis (1985/86),  during the crisis (1991), and after
the crisis (1997).  These LSMSs  include detailed information on household characteristics,
including demographic structure, income,  consumption, access to credit, and parental education,
and child outcomes,  including educational attainment and employment.  The length of the
questionnaires and therefore the potential  list of controls is much richer than that found in the
labor force surveys which have typically been used for analyses of crisis impact (for example, in
Brazil and Mexico), although the sample sizes are also smaller.  Moreover, it is rare to have high-
quality data for a middle-income  country which covers the periods before, during, and after a
crisis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly discusses the Peruvian setting
during this period.  Section 3 describes the data used for the analysis; more details on the data can
be found in a Data Appendix.  In section 4, I describe the econometric  specification,  and present
results.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  The Peruvian setting
Economic  developments.  1985-1997:  Peru followed an erratic economic course in the
1980's and 90's.  Between  1985 and 1990, the government of Alan Garcia attempted to stimulate
the economy with a "heterodox" stabilization  program,  which relied, inter alia, on reduced
foreign debt payments, a price freeze,  and economic reactivation  via wage increases, job creation
programs, and increased investments  in education and health.  These policies encouraged high
growth rates in  1986 and 87, but the inflationary  pressures and budget deficits quickly proved
2  A summary of the evidence  for Latin America can also be found in de Ferranti et. al.  (2000, pp. 73-87).
3Note that it is important to distinguish  between the effect of systemic crises, such as macroeconomic
contractions,  and idiosyncratic crises, such as loss of employment or illness of a household breadwinner on
schooling decisions.  Systemic crises are generally associated with worse employment prospects for
children, whereas  idiosyncratic crises need not be.  As a result, household responses may differ.
5unsustainable  (Glewwe  and Hall 1994).  As a result, the country slid into a deep recession and
hyper-inflation in 1988.  By the end of Garcia's government in 1990, the economy was in a state
of near-collapse:  GDP per capita had fallen by -10.5%, -13.4%, and -6.9%, and inflation had
reached  an incredible 667%,  3399%,  and 7482%,  in 1988,  89, and 90, respectively (see Figure  1).
The economic crisis came hand in hand with a deterioration  in public safety: By 1990, there was a
state of virtual civil war between the arned forces and the insurgencies of Shining Path and
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in some areas of the country,  and the conflict
was claiming at least 2,000 lives per year (INEI  1996, p. 58).
The Fujimori government which took office in 1990 opted for more orthodox economic
remedies.  Economic reforms included the elimination of controls on prices, interest rates, and
foreign exchange transactions, the reduction of tariffs, labor market de-regulation,  and a far-
reaching program of privatization.  The new policies had an immediate effect on inflation, which
fell to 74% in 1992, and to less than  12% by 1995.  Growth picked up after  1992 (Figure 1), and
poverty decreased between  1991  and 1994, and again between  1994 and 1997.  Like the crisis,
the recovery  appears to have been far-reaching,  affecting all regions and most households (World
Bank  1995 and  1999a).5 Meanwhile,  order was gradually  re-established  in the countryside,  in
particular after the capture of Abimael Guzman,  Shining Path's leader,  in 1992.
Education in Peru.  1985-1997:  In comparison with many of its Latin American
neighbors, and with other countries with similar income  levels, Peru has managed  to attain
impressively high enrolment rates in both primary and secondary  sehool: Analysis of the  1997
LSMS suggests that 97.5% of 6 to 11  year-olds, 86.3% of 12 to  17 year-olds,  and 34.9% of 18 to
25 year-olds were attending some educational institution.6 These figures are particularly
impressive  because of the low levels of public spending on education:  In  1997, total public
spending on education in Peru was 3% of GDP (2.4%, net of spending on pensions), compared
with the Latin American average  of 4.5% (World Bank 1999b).
4These figures are based on incidents reported by the Ministry of Interior, but are likely to be under-
estimates.  Other estimates place the number of deaths from terrorism  in 1990 above 3,000 (see, for
example, World Bank  1995).
5  Strict comparisons in poverty measures are not possible because of differences in the coverage of the
surveys (see section  3).
6 Author's calculations, based on the 1997 LSMS tapes.  Note that these numbers do not correspond to
those in Table  I for two reasons.  First, these are numbers for all seven regions in Peru, including rural
areas and the urban jungle, whereas the numbers in Tables  l  a and lb correspond  to Lima and the urban
areas of the coast and sierra only.  Second, these are means weighted by the appropriate  (individual)
expansion factors,  while the figures in Table  I are unweighted means.  Figures  for school attendance  for 6
to 14 year-olds based on the  1996 Peru Demographic  and Health Survey (DHS) can also be found in Filmer
(1999).  These tend to be quite similar, except for 6 year-olds,  which appear to have much lower enrollment
6Private expenditures on education  in Peru are about 2% of GDP, well above the OECD
average of 1.3%.  As in other countries,  these expenditures vary across education levels and
income quintiles.  In 1997, households spent about 3 times as much to send an 18 to 25 year-old
to school as they did to send a 6 to 11  year-old.  (Most of the older individuals would be attending
university or somte other tertiary institution,  while the younger children would be in primary
school.)  Differences across income quintiles are starker:  On average, households  in the richest
income quintile spent about 8 times as much for every child aged 6 to  11  attending school as did
households  in the poorest income quintile,  5 times as much for those aged 12 to 17,  and 4 times
as much for those aged  18 to 25.  Still, by international standards, these differences  in the
expenditure  patterns across income quintiles are modest.7
In Peru, education at the primary and secondary levels  is dominated by the public sector:
Ministry of Education figures suggest that 88.2% and 84.0% of students in primary and secondary
school,  respectively,  attend a public school; these percentages have been virtually unchanged
since  1990, when they were  88.3% and 85.6%.  The private sector plays a much larger-and
growing-role  at the tertiary level: 43%  of all tertiary education students (university and non-
university) were enrolled in a private institution in  1997, up from 37.6%  in  1990 (World Bank
1999b, Volume 2, p.  53).8
Public provision of education  has traditionally been quite centralized  in Peru.  In  1991,
however, the government  initiated a policy of deconcentration  to twelve regional  governments.
As a result, a growing fraction of resources  has been transferred  directly to the regions: In  1990,
the Ministry of Education  managed 71 % of total public expenditures  on education,  and the
regions  17%, but by  1997 these figures had been reversed, with the ministry of Education
managing 25%, and the regions 56% (World Bank 1999b, Vol.  1, p.  16).9  The regional
governments  which manage education  do not have capacity to raise own revenues,  and are
appointed by the central goveniment rather than elected."'
rates  in the DHS (61.3%), likely  as a result of differences  in the wording of the question or in the timing of
the survey during the school year.
7As a comparison,  in the Philippines households in the richest quintile spend 20 times as much per student
in primary school as households in  the poorest quintile,  1  1 times as much per student in secondary  school,
and  11 times as much per student at the tertiary level  (Schady 2001, p. 34).
8 See the caveat  given in the Data Appendix on the reliability of enrollment  and repetition  statistics
provided by the Ministry of Education.
Autonomous  universities and other government bodies manage the remaining  19%.
10  Municipal governments at the province and district levels,  by contrast,  are elected.
73.  Data and sample means
Data: The main sources of data used for this paper are the 1985/86,  1991,  and  1997 Peru
Living Standards Measurement  Surveys (LSMS).  These surveys contain reliable information  on
household characteristics,  school attendance, grade attainment and labor force participation.
The questionnaires  in all three surveys are generally comparable."  Unfortunately, the
coverage of the surveys is not comparable across years.  While the 1985/86 and 1997 LSMS
visited households in each one of Peru's seven "natural regions"-Lima, and the urban and rural
areas of the coast, sierra (or highlands) and selva (or jungle)-the  1991  LSMS sampled
households only in Lima, the urban coast, and the urban and rural areas of the sierra.  There is
also some reason to be concerned about the  1991  sample for the rural sierra: Mean income in the
rural sierra appears to be higher in  1991 than in 1997, and the mean years of education of parents
in the rural sierra approximately doubles between  1985/86 and  1991, and stays constant thereafter
(see Table la below).  It is likely that lack of funding for the 1991  survey, or the dangerous
conditions caused by widespread terrorism in the rural sierra in the early 1990's prevented
enumerators  from visiting outlying, poorer,  less well-educated  households in this region in 1991.
I therefore  limit the sample to Lima and the urban areas of the coast and sierra for all of the
analysis.  In 1997, these three regions jointly accounted for approximately 58.1 % of the
population  of the country.  (Separately,  I also run all of the regressions I report in the paper in
samples which include the rural sierra.  In all of these results, which are available from the author
upon request, the crisis impact was larger in absolute value than those I report for the urban
sample.)  More details on other sources of data and their reliability, as well as on the construction
of the variables used for my analysis can be found in a Data Appendix.
Sample means:  Tables  I  a and  lb suggest that the 1988-1992 crisis affected all regions,
and all income quintiles.  Income dropped throughout, and credit became harder to come by: The
fraction of households who report having had access to credit is lower in 1991 (16%) than in
either 1985/86 (22%) or  1997 (40%).  Tables  Ia and lb also show predictable  secular trends in
parental  education (rising),  age (rising),  and household size (falling).
Children (or their parents) make decisions about schooling and employmentjointly.  In so
doing, they sort themselves  into one of four mutually exclusive categories:  Those who attend
school only, are employed only, are neither attending  school nor employed,  and are both
attending school and employed.  In Tables I  a and lb, I show unconditional, unweighted means
" There are some unfortunate exceptions.  For example, there are differences across surveys in the recall
periods and in the level of disaggregation that is  asked in the questions concerning household expenditures
on education.
8for these four categories,  the fraction of children who have completed a standard number of years
of schooling  by age,  and a number of variables which are likely to have an effect on schooling
and employment decisions,  by survey year.  Table  la presents results for the "full" urban sample
(excluding the urban selva, which was not included  in the 1991  survey), and for each strata
separately.  Table  lb breaks down the full urban sample into men and women,  and compares the
first (poorest) and fifth (richest)  income quintiles.
I present results on attendance and employment patterns separately for children aged 6 to
11, roughly corresponding to primary school,  and children aged  12 to 17, roughly corresponding
to secondary school.  Tables I  a and  I b, and Figure 2 show that attendance  levels for school-aged
children  in urban areas are very high throughout: For children aged 6 to  11, the attendance rate is
always 97% or higher, while for children aged  12 to  17 it is always 90% or higher.  By and large,
children go to school  in urban Peru.  But the extent to which they combine school with work
changes dramatically across years.  Figure 3 shows that the fraction of children who are working
is lower at every age in 1991  than in  1985/86 or 1997.  Differences are particularly large for the
older children.  In the full urban sample,  31% and 21 % of children aged  12 to  17 are both
attending school and employed  in  1985/86 and  1997, respectively.  In  1991, by contrast,  only
12%  of the children  in this age group combine school and work.  This pattem holds consistently
across strata,  for girls as well as boys, and for children in the richest and poorest income quintiles.
The  1988-92 crisis is too recent to evaluate  its effect on the total amount of schooling
chosen by children.  However, the data can be used to assess the extent to which children of a
certain age have completed  a given number of years of schooling.  I do this in two ways.  First, I
calculate the fraction  of children who have completed an appropriate  number of years of
schooling for their age,  by survey year.  Children in Peru are expected to start first grade at age 6
or 7.  Therefore,  unless they start school  late or repeat a grade, they should have completed first
grade by age 8, second grade  by age  9,  and so on.  I consider children to be "on-track"  if they
have completed at least this number of school years for their age.  Note that this is a generous
definition of on-track,  as children who start school at age 6 should have completed first grade by
age 7.
The second approach  I take  pools data from the three surveys, and calculates the mean
years of schooling  completed  by children in different birth cohorts.  All school-aged children
surveyed in 1985/86 were unexposed to the crisis, while all school-aged children surveyed in
1991  were exposed to the crisis.  By contrast, there is a discontinuity in exposure for school-aged
children surveyed  in  1997: Those aged  11 through  17 were exposed to the crisis during their
school-aged  years, while those aged 6 through  10 were not.
9To compare differences  in the fraction of children who are on-track across years, I limit
the sample to 8 to  10 year-olds.  This is because 6 to 7 year-olds  are on-track by construction,
while children aged  11  and older in  1997 were exposed to the crisis during their school-aged
years.  Tables  1  a and  I  b show that, cond itional  on attendance  at school, the fraction of 8 to 10
year-olds  who have completed the minimum appropriate number of school years for their age is
higher in 1991 than in either  1985/86 or 1997.  In the whole  sample, 87% of 8 to  10 year-olds
were on-track in  1991,  but only 72% and  79% in  1985/86 and  1997, respectively.  Here too this
difference across years holds for all regions, for girls and boys, and for the poorest and richest
income quintiles.  Note that these comparisons could suffer from selection bias because I
condition on attendance-in particular, if "marginal" students who are less likely to make
satisfactory progress in school are more likely to start school late or drop out early.  I do not think
that this is an important source of concern,  however, given that there are only very small
variations in attendance  rates across years.
Figure 4 graphs the mean years of schooling completed  by age for children exposed and
unexposed to the crisis, without conditioning on attendance.  The graph also includes a 45 degree
line which corresponds to on-track school progression.  The results in Figure 4 are very similar to
the findings for the probability of being on-track in Tables la and  lb.  Mean years of schooling
are below the ideal on-track progression, especially at higher ages, because of school desertion
and the cumulative effects of late school entry and repetition.  However, children exposed to the
crisis have an average of between .1 and .2 more years of schooling.  There is no clear pattem
whereby the unexposed children  fall further  behind or catch up with age.
4.  Econometric specification  and results
I next pool the data from the three surveys, and turn to multivariate regressions to
estimate differences in school attendance,  employment, and school attainment.  First, I estimate
logit regressions with a dependent variable which takes on the value of one if  children are both
attending school and working, and zero if they are attending  school only.  These regressions
include dummy variables for the two "non-crisis" years (1985/86 and  1997), as well as other
controls.  The omitted category  is therefore the "crisis" year of 1991.  I report the odds-ratios  for
the 1985/86 and 1997 dummies, and interpret these as year effects conditional on changes over
time in household characteristics.  Pervasive, predictable differences  across years could be
consistent with a causal effect of the 1988-92 crisis on attendance and employment.  Second, I
estimate OLS regressions in which the dependent variable  is the number of years of schooling
completed.  These regressions  include dummy variables for two survey years, as well as a
10measure  of the number of years that school-aged  children were exposed to the crisis.  The range
of this exposure variable is therefore  between zero (children who were never of school-age during
the crisis) and five (children  who were of school age during every year between  1988 and  1992).
(Details of these exposure  calculations can be found in the Data Appendix.)  I interpret the
coefficients on the measure of exposure as the marginal effect of a year of exposure to the crisis
on the years of schooling  completed.
In both instances, I report results from a number of specifications.  In addition to the
survey year dummies (in  both the logit and OLS regressions),  and the measure of crisis exposure
(in the OLS regressions), specification (i)  includes strata dummies, gender dummies, and
unrestricted age dummies.  Information on the years of completed  education  of both parents
(separately) is also available  for a sub-sample of children-specifically,  those who live in
households in which both parents  are present and whose relationship to the household head is son
or daughter.  Specification  (ii) therefore  adds controls for the education of both parents
(separately),  unrestricted  dummies for the age structure within the household,  and a main effect in
household size.  The LSMS tapes include identifiers with which to map households  in the surveys
to the districts in which they live.1 2 The fixed-effects  specification  in (iii) limits the analysis to
households living in districts wlhich were included in the sample in 1985/86,  1991,  and 1997, and
includes  the variables  in specification (ii), as well as a dummy variable for each district.  These
regressions therefore identify differences  in attendance levels, employment levels, and
educational attainment from within-district  variation across survey years or birth cohorts.  (Note
that district fixed effects are not a satisfactory solution for the problem of differences  in the
sample  in the rural sierra between the 1985/86 and  1997 surveys on the one hand, and the  1991
survey on the other.  The likely problem  with the  1991  sample for the rural sierra is that
enumerators may not have visited outlying areas within a given district,  rather than not visiting
outlying districts.)  One disadvantage of the estimations which include measures of parental
education  and those witlh  district fixed effects  is that both are limited to sub-samples of the data.
In the three regions considered  in the analysis  in this paper, we only have data on the schooling of
both parents for 73.9% of 6 to 11  year-olds, and only 77.8% of 6 to 11  year-olds live in districts
which were included  in the sample in  1985/86,  1991,  and 1997.  Better controls therefore come at
the cost of smaller sample sizes anid less precision.
12 There are more than 1800 districts in Peru, and these are the smallest political and administrative division
in the country (roughly comparable to counties in  the United States).  According to the 1993 population
census, the average district population was about 12,600  inhabitants.  Some, predominantly rural districts
have less than 200 inhabitants,  whereas a handful of urban districts in Lima have more than I 100,000
inhabitants.  See Schady 2000, p. 3.Table 2 presents the odds ratios of attending school and being employed, relative to
attending  school only, for children aged 6 to  11  (upper panel) and children aged  12 to  17 (lower
panel).  The results show that the odds that a child aged 6 to 11  is both attending school and
working, relative to the odds that she is attending  school only, are two to four times as high in
1985/86 and  1997 as they are in  1991.  These results are significant at the 5 percent level or better
in all cases but one (the odds ratio for the 1997 dummy in specification  (iii), which has a p-value
of 0.07).  Similarly, the odds that a child aged  12 to 17 is both attending school and working,
relative to the odds that she is attending  school only, are two to three times as high in 1985/86 and
1997 as they are in  1991.  Once again, these results are quite consistent across specifications,  and
are always significant at the 5 percent level or better.  (Separately, I also estimate multinomial
logit regressions  which compare the odds ratios of neither attending school nor working, working
only, and both attending school  and working with the base category of those who attend school
only.  These estimates,  which are not reported but are available from the author upon request,
suggest that there are no differences  in the odds ratios of those who neither attend school nor
work across years, while the odds ratios of working only for 12 to  17 year olds relative to both
attending school and working are significantly higher in 1997 than in 1991).
Poorer households  are more likely to be credit-constrained  than their better-off
counterparts.  Although the means  in Table  I  b show no clear differences  in outcomes between the
first and fifth income quintiles,  it is conceivable that the regression coefficients I report in Table 2
do not hold for all income levels.  To investigate this possibility,  I predict log per capita
household  income on the basis of variables for the age, gender,  and education of the household
head, and household size and composition.  I then run non-parametric (lowess) regressions of the
probability of  being both employed and in school on predicted log income, by year.  (I use
predicted  income because of the potential endogeneity of income in a child employment
regression, but the results are very similar with actual income.)  The results, which are presented
in Figure 5, show that the probability of being both in school and employed is lower in 1991 than
in 1985/86 and  1997 across the entire income distribution.13
In additional (unreported)  specifications,  I further test for possible heterogeneity by
interacting the year dummies  in the logit regressions with (separately)  a number of household
characteristics,  such as the education  of the parents,  household size, and the strata dummies.  The
13  Comparable graphs  for the fraction of children who are attending school only, which are essentially the
complement of the graphs in Figure 5 given the very small number of children who are neither in school
nor working, and those who are working only, show that the fraction of children who are attending school
only is highest in  1991  at all  income  levels.
12coefficients on the interaction  terms are never significant,  suggesting that household responses to
the crisis did not vary significantly.
Table 3 presents  OLS regression  results for the mean years of completed  schooling.  I
report two sets of specifications:  In  the first, the measure of exposure is continuous  (upper panel),
in the second it enters as a set of dummy variables  corresponding to individual years of exposure
(lower panel).  The results for the continuous  exposure variable suggest that every year of
exposure to the crisis is associated with a .04 to .05  increase  in the number of years of schooling
attained.  That is, children  wlho were of school-age  for the entire 1988-92 period would have
completed about one-quarter more  school years than those who were entirely unexposed.  Since
completed schooling only changes by whole integers, one way of interpreting  this coefficient  is
that one out of every four or five fully exposed children will have completed  one more year of
schooling than the comparable unexposed.
The dummy variable specifications  in the lower panel of Table 3 provide weak evidence
that school attainment does not  increase proportionately  with crisis exposure: A "low" amount of
crisis exposure-l  to 2 years-appears  to have no effect on school attainment,  while "high"  crisis
exposure-3  to 5 years-increases  schooling by about 0.2 years.  One possible interpretation  of
this finding  is that children or their parents take time to adjust their schooling  and employment
decisions to a crisis.  Too much slhould  not be made of these more nuanced results, however: F-
tests on the additional  coefficients  fail to reject-the null that these dummy variable specifications
do not represent a significant  improvement  in fit over the more parsimonious specifications in
which  crisis exposure enters the regression linearly.
Discussion: Macroeconomic  crises can affect the total amount of schooling chosen, the
timing of this schooling, and the extent to which schooling  is combined  with work.  The  1988-92
crisis in Peru appears to have reduced access to credit; if anything, this should have led to a
reduction in human  capital  investment during the crisis.  The effect of the crisis on the marginal
benefits from education  is unclear in theory.  For this second channel to be part of the explanation
of my finding the crisis would have had to be perceived  both as persistent and as
disproportionately  affecting the earnings and employment prospects of low-skilled workers.
Comparisons based on the 1985/86,  1991, and 1997  LSMS suggest that incomes  fell substantially
for households with heads with different amounts of schooling."4 Moreover,  using data from
14 Glewwe and Hall (1998)  report results  based on a panel of households in Lima only included in the
1985/86 LSMS and in a follow-up survey conducted in  1990 which suggest that households  in which the
head had more schooling suffered  simaller  income losses.  I find no clear pattern: A simple tabulation of
income by the education of the household head shows that mean income fell by more in households  with
heads with some secondary  education (-41 %) than in households with primary education or less (-27%), or
13annual  labor force surveys conducted in Lima, Saavedra (1998) and Saavedra and Maruyama
(1998) show that the rate of return to education estimated from a standard Mincerian regression
fell noticeably during the crisis (from .11  in 1987 to .08 in  1991), and rose steadily thereafter (to
about .13 in 1995).  It therefore seems unlikely that changes in access to credit or changes in the
marginal benefit to education can  explain the patterns in school attendance and completion rates I
observe.
The effect of the crisis in Peru on education outcomes appears to have operated through a
substantial reduction  in forgone income.  Real wages in urban areas dropped precipitously  during
the crisis.  The results in  Saavedra (1998) for Lima suggest that the mean real monthly wage for
informal sector workers fell  from about 600 soles  in  1987 to 200 soles in 1991,  before recovering
partially to about 400 soles  in  1987.  The estimates for formal sector workers are even more
staggering,  indicating a drop from  1200 soles to 200 soles between  1987 and 1991,  and a
recovery to 800 soles by 1997.  These results suggest that there was a massive decline in the
opportunity cost of schoolinig  in Lima during the crisis.
Children who hold jobs in Peru in "normal"  years may have been less willing and able to
combine school and work during the 1988-92 crisis.  The extent to which a reduction in child
employment frees up time for sclhooling  or child leisure is a hotly contested topic in the literature
on child labor (see, for example,  Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos  1999; Basu 1999; Basu and
Van 1998; Jensen and Skyt Nielsen  1997; Psacharopoulos  1997; Ravallion and Wodon 2000;
Rosenzweig  and Evenson  1977).  The three Peru LSMS have no time allocation data, and can
therefore not be used to answer this question conclusively.  But the results I present in this paper
are consistent with some substitution  between employment and schooling:  During the 1988-92
crisis, children in Peru were  less likely to combine school with work, and they were more likely
to make adequate grade progress.  Arguably, children who were not working could expend more
"effort" in school.
Some possible concerns with interpretation  of my results are the effects of late school
entry;  possible changes  in public expenditures on education; changes in the quality of education;
and migration patterns, specifically migration from rural to urban areas.  I discuss each of these in
turn.
some tertiary education (-25%).  The recovery in incomes between  1991 and  1997, by contrast, clearly
favored households  with more schooling:  The incomes of households with heads with primary education or
less increased  by 2% between  1991  and 1997,  by 19% for households with some secondary  education, and
by 76% for households  with some tertiary education.  Note that long-term trends in the marginal benefits  to
schooling are unlikely to account for my results because education attainment  improved between 1985/86
and  1991, and worsened between  1991  and 1997.
14Late school entry may be a concern  because of the way I define crisis exposure.  There is
some evidence  from Ghana that parents  delay schooling entry if their children are malnourished
(Glewwe and Jacoby 1995).  If the  1988-92 crisis in Peru led to a deterioration in nutritional
status, then young children surveyed  in  1997 whom I have defined as "unexposed" to the crisis
(because they were not of scliool-age  during the crisis) may have started school late, and therefore
have completed fewer years  of schooling for their age than they would have in the absence of the
crisis.'5 There is no completely  satisfactory way of resolving this problem,  but I do not believe
that this is the explanation  for thie  patterns I observe.  First, enrollment rates for young children
are very high throughout, suggesting that late entry is not much of an issue  in urban Peru.
Second,  in separate results (not reported, but available from the author upon request),  I show that
school attainment  is higher in  1991  thaan  in either 1985/86 or 1997.  Of course, it is possible that
the improvement  in attainment between  1985/86 and  1991  is explained by an upward underlying
time trend, while the deterioration  in attainment between  1991  and 1997 is explained by patterns
of late entry for young children  exposed to the crisis, but this seems unlikely to me.  Moreover, a
decree which was passed between the  1995 and 1996  school years in  Peru whereby all children
who completed first grade were automatically promoted to second grade could downward-bias
the estimates of the crisis on school attainment  I report.  By construction,  all first-graders aged 8
or younger in  1995, who stood to benefit from the automatic promotion policy, are defined as
unexposed to the crisis because they would be  10 or younger in 1997.
An increase in public expenditures  on education  during a crisis could reduce the marginal
cost of education  (for example,  if the increase  in expenditures takes the form of scholarships) or
increase the marginal benefits (for example, if the increase in expenditures  improves the quality
of education).  The Garcia  governiment put no program in place to attempt to encourage  schooling
attainment during the crisis.  Indeed,  as Figure 6 shows, public expenditures  on education
followed roughly the same pattern  as per capita GDP-rising sharply between  1985/86 and  1987,
dropping equally sharply between  1987 and  1991,  and steadily increasing thereafter.  If anything,
the constant attendance  patterns and the improvements  in age-specific  grade completion during
the crisis took place in spite oftlhe evolution of public expenditures  on education.  Moreover,  it is
unlikely that households compensated  for changes  in public expenditures  by increasing private
expenditures on education  between  1985/86 and 1991,  and decreasing them thereafter:  At best,
i5 I thank John Maluccio for this comment.  In future research,  I intend to look at the impact of the  1988-92
crisis on nutrition outcomes  in Peru.
15households may have been able to protect these expenditures  somewhat  in the context of dramatic
cut-backs in overall household  income.  6
The fall in public expenditures  on education during the crisis may have had an attendant
effect on quality.  This, in turn, could eventually affect the productivity and wages of cohorts of
children who received their education in crisis years."  One way to test for these effects would be
to supplement standard Mincerian  wage regressions  with measures of crisis exposure, as well as
(possibly) with an interaction  term between  schooling and exposure.  The  1988-82 crisis in Peru
is too recent to assess these possible  long-term consequences,  as many of the affected cohorts are
still in school.  However, the possible negative effect of the crisis on school quality is a caveat to
my conclusion that the  1988-92 contraction  had a "positive"  overall effect on human capital
accumulation.
Finally, migration is a concern  because the sample is limited to Lima, and the urban areas
of the coast and sierra.  In Peru,  migration has traditionally been from rural to urban areas,
although there appears to have been an  important migration from urban to rural areas in the mid-
1990's.  This reverse migration was a result of the increase in security in the countryside which
followed the lower levels of activity of Shining Path and MRTA after  1992, as well as of a
deliberate policy designed to encourage  resettlement of abandoned rural areas.  (This policy
included the creation of special  government programs, such as PAR, the Programa de Apoyo al
Repoblamiento.)  Given lower mean incomes  and lower adult education levels in rural areas, a
reasonable assumption is that the underlying  propensities to attend school and be on-track are
lower-or at least no higher-among the migrants than the sedentary population.  Another way to
think about this is that the migrant populations are likely to have lower "ability" to attend school
and make satisfactory grade progress.  Rural-to-urban  migration would tend to diminish ability in
the sample in 1991  relative to  1985/86, while urban-to-rural migration could also diminish ability
in 1991  relative to 1997.  To the extent that this is the case, the estimates of the effect of the crisis
I report would be downward-biased:  In the absence of migration, the estimated coefficients on the
measures of crisis exposure would have been even larger.
16 Data from countries  affected by the  1998 East Asian crisis, for example,  show a varied picture: In
Indonesia, private expenditures  on education fell both in absolute terms and as a share of total household
expenditures, whereas in Korea expenditures  on education fell by less than overall household spending
(World Bank 2000, p.  121).
17 I thank Francisco Ferreira for this point.
165.  Conclusion
In this paper, I show that the profound economic crisis in Peru between  1988 and 1992
did not have a negative  effect on the investments households made in the human capital of their
children.  Children exposed to the crisis were less likely to combine work with school, and had
completed more years of education  for their age than those unexposed to the crisis.
The call for a "socially  responisible macroeconomic  policy" which protects the poor
during economic downturns  has lately received a great deal of attention (this term, from Lustig
2000).  There is no doubt that the poor often suffer disproportionately  during crises-both in
absolute terms, and because even a small  reduction in their incomes can have dramatic effects on
their welfare.  The analysis  in tlis paper slhows, however, that the poor, like other households, are
extremely reluctant to make cutbacks  in key human capital investments.  Indeed, because
macroeconomic  crises normally depress employment prospects, poor households may rationally
choose to invest more, not less, in education.
Programs of targeted  caslh transfers conditional on behavior  such as school attendance
have been implemented  in a number of Latin American countries,  including the PROGRESA
program in Mexico, and the Bolsa Escola in Brazil.  These programs effectively lower the price
of schooling for poor households  and,  insofar as the demand for schooling is reasonably price-
elastic, may increase the schoolinig attainment of children in poor households.  More recently,
policy makers have also begun to consider  increasing the budgets of these programs during a
crisis.  The aim of these crisis-induced budget  increases would be twofold:  To transfer additional
income to poor households,  and  prevent school  desertion.  Transferring income to poor credit-
constrained households during a crisis  is likely to substantially increase their welfare.  But the
results in this paper suggest that thie  probability of dramatic,  crisis-induced increases  in school
desertion may have been overstated.
17Data Appendix
This Data Appendix discusses  the reliability of sources of data other than the LSMS
surveys which could potentially be used to evaluate the impact of the 1988-92 crises in Peru on
education and employment outcomes.  I also present details concerning the construction of
variables used in the analysis.
Data reliability:  I made several  attempts to supplement the LSMS with other data, with
only limited success.  Demographic  and Health Surveys (DHS) have  been conducted in Peru in
1986,  1992,  1996, and 2000.  Unfortunately,  the  1986 survey did not collect information on the
schooling and employment  status of clhildren.  The DHS therefore have the disadvantage of not
having data for the period before thie crisis.
I use national accounts  data for a general description of national economic  trends in the
1980's and  1990's.  Up to  1995,  regional  branches of INEI also computed estimates of GDP for
each one of Peru's 25 departments.  These data would have been useful for a difference-in-
difference analysis of the impact of the crisis.  But combining these data with the survey data
raises serious problems of measurement error.  The department-level  pattern of crisis and
recovery which comes out of the nationial  accounts data is strikingly varied-indeed,  so varied as
to seem less-than-credible  given anecdotal evidence about the depth of the crisis throughout the
country.'8 There are also problems  merging these data with the household-level data from the
surveys.  Only  15 departments  were covered  in both the 1985/86  and 1991 surveys, and the
sample sizes vary wildly across departments-ranging  from more than 2,000 individuals between
ages 6 to 17 in Lima to less tlhan  50  in some of the smaller departments.  A further source of
measurement error is introduced  by the fact that the department-level GDP figures purport to
cover both urban and rural areas, whereas the analysis conducted in this paper is based on the
urban  samples of Lima, the coast, and  tihe sierra only.  For these reasons, I do not provide
difference-in-difference  estimates of the impact of the crisis.
The Ministry of Education  keeps information  on total public recurrent and capital
expenditures  on education during the  period, and I use these data to inspect whether changes  in
school outcomes could be attribuLted to clhanges  in spending patterns, rather than to changes  in the
economic environment.  These data are considered to be reasonably accurate and comparable
18 This large regional variation in  the estimates occurs even though INEI "imputed" part of the department-
level flows  using data for the entire country:  For example,  in some economic sectors, national changes are
attributed to different departments  according to the fraction of the stock of total employment or total
industry output located in each department.  In  general,  one would expect that this procedure  would tend to
make estimated department-level  growth rates more similar to each other.
18over time.  I also attempted to use administrative data on enrollment and repetition levels,  but
discarded these as unreliable.  Administrative data on enrollment in various grade levels is
collected in Peru from the school headmiiasters  themselves.  This creates  a serious incentive
problem, as headmasters  inflate enrollmenit figures to receive larger transfers.  The last time that
the Ministry of Education  figLires could  be checked,  by comparing them with the figures from the
1993  population  census, there  were estimated to be almost one million "ghost" students in the
statistics supplied  by the lheadmasters themselves.  Moreover, these (highly unreliable) figures are
available for only three years-l 993,  1998, and 1999.  The administrative enrollment and
repetition figures for other years in the 1980's and 1990's are based on imputations which
statisticians at the Ministry of EdLucation  tlhemselves  do using the LSMS surveys.
Construction  of variables:  In  tlis paper, I consider the impact of the 1988-92 crisis on
three outcomes: School attendanice,  employment,  and the mean years of completed schooling.  I
define attendance  based oii two  LLIuestiolns  in the LSMS: All household members aged 6 or older
are first asked whether they are "currently  attending school  or studying something",  and those
who answer "no"  are then asked wlhether  tlley "attended  school or studied something in the last
12 months". 19 The variable I construLct  for attendance takes the value of one for all individuals
who answer "yes" to either one of these questions.  Note that it is important to take into account
both these questions, as a large  lractioni of households  in the 1985/86 LSMS were surveyed
during the summer vacation  montlhs of December though March,  so that attendance rates based
on only the first question  in this  suLrvey would appear to be unreasonably low.  I also construct a
variable for the total  number of years of sclhooling completed based on questions about age and
attainment in the surveys.
The measure of employiienlt  used in this paper is based on separate questions asked of all
household  members aged 6 or older.  These questions  first ask respondents  whether they worked
"as an employee  for a business, corporation,  government, a boss, or another individual", and
second, whether they worked  "fob-  tlhemselves"  ("a cuenta propia", or self employed), "as an
unpaid family member,  or on  the (fainily) farm".  The reference  period for both questions is the
last week; follow-up questionis  wvith  longer reference  periods (12 months) are asked of those who
'9 This measure of "attendance"  does  not take into account the number of times children are actually going
to school-a shortcoming of the data.  Using the term "enrollment"  would also be somewhat inaccurate,
however,  as children may be formally enrolled in school, but not attend.  The Spanish word used in the
questions in  the surveys ("asistir  al  colegio") is closer to attendance than it is to enrollment  (the translation
for enrollment would be "estar inscri/o en  el colegio").  See Paxson and Schady  1999 for a similar
construction  of variables.
19did not work in the last week.  For the purposes of this paper, I consider all those who answer
affirmatively to any of the four quLestions to have been employed.20
The Peruvian think-tank  GRADE  hias calculated comparable consumption and income
aggregates for the 1985/86,  1991,  and  1997 LSMS,  as well as for an LSMS conducted in 1994.
Specifically,  GRADE  used  1997 price deflators to adjust for price differences  across natural
regions, and the national CPI to deflate consumption  and income over time.  I use GRADE's
income aggregates for the estimations  in this paper, but do not use the 1994 LSMS for the
analysis because the GRADE aggregates  suggest that mean income in this year was lower than in
1991, while the national accoulnts show  a clear improvement in income per capita during this
period.  It is therefore unclear wlhether  1994 should be treated as a "crisis" year. 
21 In addition to
income,  I take variables from  the LSMS  on1  household composition and size, age, and access to
credit.
Table 4 provides detai ls on the construction of the crisis exposure variable used for the
OLS regressions in Table 3.  Years of exposure is determined by the number of years a child was
aged 6 to 17 during the  1988-92 period.  For the age calculations, all children surveyed in
1985/86 are taken to have been surveyed  in 1985, given that the majority of households were
surveyed in 1985 rather thani  1986.
20 In the  1985/86  and 1991  surveys, working "on the farm"  and working "for themselves,  or as an unpaid
family member" are asked separately, whereas in the 1997  survey both options are listed as part of the same
question.  Household chores are meant to be excluded from these categories,  and are asked about in the
following questions.
21  See Deaton 2000 for an analysis and  possible explanations  of such divergences between the survey and
national accounts figures for India il the 1990's.
20Table 4: Exposure, by age and survey year
Age  Survey Year  Exposure
6  1985/86  0
7  1985/86  0
8  1985/86  0
9  1985/86  0
10  1985/86  0
11  1985/86  0
12  1985/86  0
13  1985/86  0
14  1985/86  0
15  1985/86  0
16  1985/86  0
17  1985/86  0
6  1991  1
7  1991  2
8  1991  3
9  1991  4
10  1991  5
11  1991  5
12  1991  5
13  1991  5
14  1991  5
15  1991  5
16  1991  5
17  1991  5
6  1997  0
7  1997  0
8  1997  0
9  1997  0
10  1997  0
11  1997  1
12  1997  2
13  1997  3
14  1997  4
15  1997  5
16  1997  5
17  1997  5
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26Figurc 4:  Years of Completed Schooling,  by Age
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27Figure 5: Probability of both attending school and being employed, by year
(i)  6 to 11 year-olds
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29Table la: Sample  means (unweighted),  by region and year
Urban sample  Lima only  Urban Coast only  Urban sierra only  Rural sierra only
(excluding  urban selva)
YEAR  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997
/86  /86  /86  /86  /86
Prop. attending school  only (6-11)  0.90  0.97  0.92  0.92  0.98  0.95  0.91  0.99  0.93  0.83  0.94  0.87  0.41  0.70  0.37
Prop. employed only (6-11)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01
Prop. neither in school nor employed  (6-11)  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01
Prop. both in school  and emiployed (6-11)  0.10  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.02  0.04  0.09  0.01  0.05  0.17  0.06  0.11  0.57  0.29  0.60
Prop. attendiig school  only(I2-17)  0.64  0.82  0.71  0.68  0.83  0.74  0.62  0.87  0.71  0.56  0.75  0.65  0.15  0.36  0.17
Prop.  employed only (12-17)  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.22  0.07  0.19
Prop. neither in school nor employed (12-17)  0.02  0.03  003  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.02
Prop. both in school and employed (12-17)  0.31  0.12  0.21  0.28  0.11  0.18  0.30  0.06  0.19  0.39  0.20  0.29  0.61  0.54  0.61
Proportion  on-track for  age (8-10) *  0.72  0.87  0.79  0.71  0.84  0.79  0.69  0.90  0.72  0.77  0.90  0.85  0.35  0.69  0.65
Log (per capita income)  7.64  7.34  7.64  7.82  7.44  7.77  7.42  7.27  7.45  7.48  7.22  7.58  7.22  6.92  6.63
Proportionwith access to credit  0.22  0.16  0.40  0.23  0.15  0.39  0.18  0.15  0.40  0.23  0.21  0.40  0.10  0.11  0.19
Proportion  rural  ---  ---  ---  - ---  ---  --  ---  - - ---  --  1.00  1.00  1.00
Mean age  25.27  26.71  28.92  25.98  27.27  29.20  24.35  26.91  29.10  24.83  25.60  28.08  24.42  25.60  25.20
Meanyearsofeducationoffather  7.63  8.52  8.72  8.30  8.48  8.98  6.64  7.49  7.82  7.33  9.39  9.20  3.15  5.16  5.20
Mean years of education of mother  5.73  6.80  7.28  6.33  6.66  . 7.59  5.14  6.11  6.26  5.15  7.55  7.77  1.38  3.23  3.05
Mean household  size  6.46  6.14  5.98  6.34  6.25  .6.03  6.65  6.32  6.12  6.47  5.83  5.72  6.30  5.69  6.06
* Conditional on school attendance.
30Table lb: Sample means (unweighted),  by year, gender, and income quintile (urban sample, excluding  urban selva)
Males  Females  Poorest income quintile  Richest income quintile
YEAR  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997  1985  1991  1997
/86  /86  /86  /86
Prop. attending  school  only (6-11)  0.90  0.97  0.92  0.90  0.96  0.92  0.90  0.96  0.91  0.92  0.97  0.95
Prop. employed  only (6-11)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Prop. neithier in sclool ior emiployed (6-11)  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.()0  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01
Prop.  boti in sciool aid employed  (6-11)  0.10  0.02  0.06  0.10  0.03  0.05  0.10  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.02  0.0S
Prop. attending school  only (12-17)  0.58  0.82  0.69  0.69  0.81  0.73  0.60  0.82  0.67  0.75  0.82  0.77
Prop. employed only (12-17)  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.02
Prop.  neither in school  nor employed  (12-17)  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.04
Prop. both in school and employed (12-17)  0.37  0.12  0.23  0.25  0.12  0.19  0.32  0.12  0.24  0.21  0.13  0.16
Proportion on-track for  age (8-10)*  0.74  0.87  0.77  0.70  0.88  0.80  0.60  0.88  0.74  0.81  0.91  0.87
Log (per  capita  income)  7.65  7.35  7.64  7.62  7.33  7.64  6.34  6.27  6.60  8.87  8.42  8.75
Proportionwith access to credit  0.21  0.16  0.40  0.22  0.16  0.39  0.11  0.18  0.35  0.32  0.21  0.41
Proportion rural  ---  --  ---  ----  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Mean age  24.78  26.19  28.48  25.74  27.20  29.34  22.60  24.84  26.23  29.19  29.81  32.47
Meanyearsofeducationoffather  7.61  8.42  8.70  7.65  8.62  8.73  5.52  7.13  7.07  9.67  10.35  11.20
Mean years of education of mother  5.68  6.79  7.26  5.79  6.80  7.30  3.81  5.66  5.60  7.87  8.93  9.97
Mean household size  6.46  6.17  6.02  6.45  6.11  5.94  7.26  6.55  6.59  5.26  5.10  4.84
* Conditional on  school attendance.
31Table 2: Odds-ratios of both attending school and being employed
Children aged  6 to  11
1985/86  4.43***  4.11***  3.35***
[1.23]  [1.34]  [1.22]
1991
1997  2.42***  3.15***  1.98*
[0.72]  [1.16]  [0.78]
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.12  0.15
N  4,220  3,086  2,193
Children aged  12 to 17
1985/86  3.52***  2.68***  2.79***
[0.52]  [0.441  [0.51]
1991
1997  2.09***  2.39***  2.21***
[0.32]  [0.42]  [0.47]
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.11  0.14
N  4,113  2,939  2,135
Note: The dependent variable takes on a value of one if children are both attending school and employed,
and zero if they are in school only.  Children are considered to be employed if they responded affirmatively
to any one of the following four questions  in the surveys: (i) "In the last 7 days, did you work as an
employee  for a business, corporation,  government,  a boss, or another individual?";  (ii) "and in the last 12
months?"; (iii)  In the last 7  days, did you work for yourself, ("a cuenta propia", or self employed), or as an
unpaid family member, or on the farm?"; (iv) and in the last  12 months?".
* Significant  at the  10%  level or better; ** significant at the 5%  level or better;  ***significant at the 1%
level or better.
Standard errors in square brackets  are corrected for heteroskedasticity  and clustering.
Specification (i) includes strata and gender controls,  and a vector of age dummies;  specification (ii)
supplements  specification  (i)  with variables for the education of both parents (separately), variables  for the
number of household members under 3,  between 3  and 5, between 6 and 8, between 9 and 11, between  12
and 14, and between  15 and  17,  as well as a variable for the size of household; the fixed-effects
specification  in (iii) limits the sample to households  living in districts which were included in the sample in
1985/86,  1991,  and 1997,  and includes the variables in specification (ii), as well as a dummy variable  for
each district.
32Table 3: Average Number of Years Passed, Aged 6 to 17
(i)  (ii)  (iii)
Years of crisis exposure  0.050***  0.044**  0.043**
[0.02]  [0.021  [0.021
R-squared  0.81  0.86  0.87
N  8,646  6,203  4,917
Crisis exposure  = 0
Crisis exposure = 1  0.008  0.057  0.035
[0.07]  [0.08]  [0.091
Crisis exposure = 2  -0.011  0.052  0.089
[0.08]  [0.091  [0.10]
Crisis exposure = 3  0.204**  0.165*  0.173*
[0.08]  [0.09]  [0.10]
Crisis exposure = 4  0.184**  0.236**  0.234**
[0.09]  [0.10]  [0.11]
Crisis exposure = 5  0.224**  0.204*  0.199*
[0.09]  [0.10]  [0.12]
R-squared  0.82  0.86  0.87
N  8,646  6,203  4,917
Note: The dependent variable  is  the number of years of schooling completed.
* Significant at the  10%  level or better; ** significant  at the 5%  level or better; ***significant at the  1%
level or better.
Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity  and clustering.
Specification  (i) includes year dummies for  1985/86 and  1997, strata and gender controls,  and a vector of
age  dummies;  specification (ii)  supplements specification (i) with variables for the education of both
parents (separately),  variables for the number of household members under 3, between 3 and 5, between 6
and 8, between 9 and  11,  between  12 and  14, and between  15  and 17, as well as a variable  for the size of
household; the fixed-effects  specification  in (iii) limits the sample to households living in districts which
were included in the sample in  1985/86,  1991, and  1997, and includes the variables in specification (ii),  as
well  as a dummy variable for each district.
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